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<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> SECRET<OSRI> RUEAIIA<DTG> 282313Z JAN 87
<ORIG> FM CIA
<TO> TO RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

<TEXT>

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SECTION 1 OF 2

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REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON
DIST: 28 JANUARY 1987

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

SUBJ: POW/MIA: COMMENTS OF A VIETNAMESE MILITARY ATTACHE ON THE
MIA ISSUE AND LINKAGE TO U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO CHINA

DOI: MID-JANUARY 1987

SOURCE:

TEXT: 1. DURING A PRIVATE CONVERSATION IN MID-JANUARY 1987, A
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) HIGH-RANKING MILITARY OFFICER
ASSIGNED ABROAD, COMMENTED ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE BILATERAL
U.S.-SRV EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE MIA PROBLEM. HE STATED THAT THERE
WOULD BE NO PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE UNLESS THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT ADDRESSES SRV CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. WEAPONS SUPPLIES TO
CHINA THAT ARE BEING USED AGAINST SRV TROOP POSITIONS ALONG THE SINO-
VIETNAMESE BORDER. HE ALSO ALLEGED THAT SRV TROOPS SUSTAINED
SIGNIFICANT CASUALTIES DURING THE RECENT BORDER ENGAGEMENTS, DUE
PRIMARILY TO U.S.-SUPPLIED ARTILLERY GUIDANCE RADAR SYSTEMS DEPLOYED
ALONG THE FRONTIER. COMMENT: THE SRV OFFICER IS CONVINCED
THAT U.S. SUPPLIED ARTILLERY LOCATING RADAR SETS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED
BY THE CHINESE ALONG THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER FOR USE AGAINST SRV
TROOP AND ARTILLERY POSITIONS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO
AVAILABLE INFORMATION, U.S. RADAR IS NOT DEPLOYED ALONG THE SINO-
VIETNAMESE BORDER.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: A U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY
SALE OF FOUR FIREFINDER ARTILLERY LOCATING SETS--AN/TPQ-37-V4 WITH
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS-- HAS BEEN
OFFICIALLY PROPOSED FOR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SALE TO CHINA.
COCOM APPROVAL FOR THE SALE WAS RECEIVED IN DECEMBER 1986. IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY U.S. CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIONS, THE SALE SHOULD BE
CONCLUDED CIRCA FEBRUARY

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2. THE SRV MILITARY OFFICER INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE U.S. DID NOT GIVE EXPLICIT APPROVAL OF RECENT CHINESE MILITARY INCURSIONS INTO VIETNAMESE TERRITORY, U.S. MILITARY SALES TO CHINA LEND TACIT SUPPORT TO CHINESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE SRV. HE ALSO STATED THAT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE, WHETHER IT INVOLVES MODERN OR DATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, JEOPARDIZES THE MILITARY BALANCE ON THE FRONTIER AND INCREASES SRV SUSPICIONS ABOUT U.S. MOTIVES IN THE REGION. ALTHOUGH THE SRV RESENTS U.S. MILITARY AID TO THE CHINESE, WHICH IS SUBSEQUENTLY DEPLOYED AGAINST VIETNAMESE TROOP POSITIONS, THE OFFICER POINTED OUT THAT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HOPES TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH BEIJING AND DOES NOT OBJECT IN PRINCIPLE TO IMPROVED U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL RELATIONS. SIMILARLY, THE SRV DOES NOT OBJECT TO VISITS BY U.S. NAVAL VESSELS FROM THE U.S. SEVENTH FLEET AT CHINESE PORTS. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT UNTIL THE U.S. ADDRESSES SRV CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. MILITARY SALES TO CHINA, THERE CAN BE NO FURTHER MOVEMENT TOWARD AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION OF THE MIA ISSUE.

3. THE SRV MILITARY OFFICER ALSO SAID THAT U.S. EFFORTS TO DATE TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE SEARCH FOR MIA REMAINS ON VIETNAMESE TERRITORY HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT. THE SRV HAD HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD ASSIST SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE LOCATION, EXCAVATION, EXHUMATION AND TRANSPORT OF ANY MIA REMAINS AS PRESENT COSTS TO THE SRV GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT THESE ACTIVITIES ARE PROHIBITIVE.

4. BASED ON THE ABOVE, THE MILITARY OFFICER STATED THAT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS DEFERRED FROM TAKING FURTHER INITIATIVES TO MEET U.S. CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS THE MIA ISSUE.
ACQ: (22 JANUARY 1987).

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ECL: OADR DRV [REDACTED] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS

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CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 2251<TOR> 870128182721 MSG000160165640
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 2252<TOR> 870128182749 MSG000160165669

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